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The need for technological and eco-
nomic development has remained 
central in the political agenda of the 
mainstream Islamist movements up 
to the present. In Egypt in particular 
groups such as the Muslim Brothers, 
the Labour Party1 (Hizb al-‘Amal), and 
the Centre Party2 (Hizb al-Wasat) have 
devoted a great deal of their political 
energy to criticizing the failure of the 
economic development effort, and em-
phasize the need for building an inde-
pendent technological base in Muslim 
countries, in order to escape the current total dependence on Western 
and East Asian countries for advanced equipment. Through their press 
and as elected representatives, Islamists call for rapid industrializa-
tion, improved communications, upgrading basic infrastructure and 
services in the villages, etc. Not least, beyond the level of immediate 
questions of economic policy, the Islamist interpretation of the social 
message of Islam is much conducive to economic development, and 
reminiscent of the Protestant ethics that Max Weber saw as propitious 
to capitalist development in Europe. This will be confirmed by a glance 
at what Egyptian thinkers linked to the Muslim Brothers and the La-
bour Party have written on economic questions.3
Based on their pronouncements the building of a strong and tech-
nologically advanced economy emerges as a sacred duty. For Adil 
Husayn, the deceased charismatic ideologue 
of the Labour Party’s turn to Islamism, this was 
an integral part of the quest for independence 
which was at the heart of his political and intel-
lectual efforts. Economy professors Yusuf Kamal 
and Husayn Shahhata, central spokesmen for 
the Muslim Brothers on economic issues, for 
their part state that the Islamic Sharia aims at 
comprehensive development in order to achieve 
strength and glory for the Muslim nation. They 
claim that mankind is entrusted with a sacred 
obligation to exploit natural resources to the full 
for the increase of the material wealth of society, 
and that economic development is a fard kifaya, 
a collective duty, to be secured by the state if in-
dividuals fail to promote it with sufficient force. 
The whole development effort is likened to a 
jihad. Both Kamal and Shahhata emphasize the 
centrality of the development effort in an Islamic 
system through stating that zakat revenue can 
be used by the state for productive investment 
in order to further development. Shahhata states 
that work is to be considered a form of ‘ibada, part of the worship 
of God. This implies that the perfection of one’s work is a religious 
obligation equal in importance to the fulfilment of ritual duties like 
prayer and fasting, and is reminiscent of the Protestant idea of work 
as a calling. Shahhata holds up the furtherance of public interest, 
maslaha, as equal to fulfilling God’s will, and in line with this he ac-
cords the call for modernizing the economy priority over the formal 
fulfilment of tenets of fiqh, as in Islamist critique of “Islamic” invest-
ment companies and banks for not investing in projects which would 
contribute to the development of production. 
There is an old fiqh principle stating that in considering maslaha in 
the choice between possible interpretations of the Quran or Sunna 
on a specific point of jurisprudence, one should proceed accord-
ing to a descending ladder of priorities: first necessities, daruriyyat, 
then needs, hajat, then improvements, 
tahsinat. The Muslim Brothers take up 
this list of priorities and adopt it as 
“Islamic priorities for production and 
investment,”4 so that Muslim society, 
and the Islamic state as its representa-
tive, must before anything else secure 
the sufficient allocation of resources 
for the procurement of basic necessi-
ties for the population. Even if self-pro-
claimed Islamic financial institutions 
can be said to be operating without 
interest it does not make them Islamic 
in the eyes of the Muslim Brothers and the Labour Party if they do not 
support this effort, but concentrate on financing trade and currency 
speculation.
God’s stewards on earth
There is common agreement among Islamist writers that private 
property is the basic principle in Islam and that this is necessary for 
stimulating men to exert their best efforts at developing and preserv-
ing wealth.5 Still they all stress that public interest takes priority over 
private interests. A central idea is that of man as “God’s steward (kha-
lifa) on earth.”6 Everyone has the right to private property, but this right 
is limited by the fact that all wealth ultimately belongs to God. The in-
dividual is seen as holding property in trust from God and from soci-
ety as God’s deputy, as it were. Therefore private 
property involves a social responsibility. It should 
be made to bear fruit in the service of society, and 
it should be preserved and developed for future 
generations. And others have claims on the prop-
erty; that is, the return it brings or even parts of 
the property itself may be needed to satisfy ur-
gent needs of the wider community. 
The Egyptian Islamists consider it a task for an 
Islamic state to secure a minimum of welfare to all 
members of society. This is to be realized through 
concentrating investment and production on 
the provision of basic necessities, and, centrally 
for Kamal and Shahhata, through the zakat. The 
Muslim Brother writers emphasize that the zakat 
should provide more than what is necessary for 
mere survival; every member of society should 
have the right to a certain degree of enjoyment 
of life.7 The ideal of the just Islamic society is not 
one of radical egalitarianism, but rather of bal-
ance, of Islam as a moderate third way avoiding 
the excesses of capitalism and communism. This 
implies that the ideal is to seek a harmonious balance between differ-
ent social groups and between generations. Class conflict is seen as an 
evil which it is an imperative to avoid lest its divisive cancer split society 
into warring factions.
The liberating force of faith 
Over and above the general principles enunciated as guiding an Is-
lamic economy, the Islamist writers emphasize the liberating force of 
faith in itself. Faith induces good behaviour towards others and there-
by creates a solid framework for social solidarity, says Kamal. Husayn 
stresses belief in a sacred doctrine as an indispensable prerequisite for 
the will to sacrifice without which any serious development effort is 
doomed to failure. More generally this is linked to the idea that a true 
Muslim is involved in an unceasing battle for good against evil, and 
Middle Eastern Islamists have been unequivocal 
advocates of bringing their societies up to 
the technological level of modern industrial 
society. In fact, the most fertile recruiting 
ground for Islamist organizations has been 
students in technological and natural science 
subjects. As Islamist movements gather 
strength year by year, and are poised to be 
the main beneficiaries of any turn towards 
democratic government in the region, it seems 
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but also in view of the individualizing aspects of Islamist interpreta-
tion of the Islamic message. There is a strong focus on the individual as 
responsible not only for his own proper conduct but for all the affairs 
of society and state that contrasts with more traditional communalist 
attitudes and a traditional division of roles where politics would be the 
domain of notables and religion that of the clerical leaders. Especially 
with the Muslim Brothers the focus on individual duties is coupled with 
a strong defence of individual rights against the encroachment of the 
state. Common to all Islamists is a strong emphasis on merit, which is 
the idea that there should be full access to social 
mobility for every individual regardless of fam-
ily background, and that all promotions should 
take place based on consideration of individual 
merit in piety and in efficient and good work. This 
would require equal access to education and em-
ployment and an end to age-old practices of nep-
otism and favouritism in public and business life.
The stress on merit is therefore closely linked to 
the Islamists’ frenetic campaigning against cor-
ruption. The main target is the misuse of public 
office to further personal interests or those of 
individual or groups close to the office holder. 
The Islamists criticize officials taking bribes and 
illegitimate charges for exercising their duties, 
and denounce the misappropriation of funds 
for buying votes and for paying commissions to 
cronies of people in office, or by awarding public 
contracts to other than the one presenting the 
best tender. In this can also be seen a moderniz-
ing aspect, in that the borderline is very thin and 
vague between corruption and traditional pa-
tron-client relations. One might perhaps say that 
corruption thrives in the confrontation between 
inherited social structures based on the recipro-
cal solidaric obligations of kinship and client net-
works, and the institutions of a modern market 
and a modern state. The Islamists seem not only 
in their campaigning against corruption, but also 
to the extent that they are involved in business, 
to favour a detached impersonal style focused on 
economic efficiency.
should use her or his measured time in this 
world in a disciplined and purposeful way. 
When the energy of the believer through 
the values listed above is directed towards 
the increase of material production, Islamist 
doctrine would seem to possess a substan-
tial potential for economic mobilization. 
This is true not least since there is an em-
phasis not only on an Islamic state enforc-
ing these values, but ultimately on them 
being internalized as natural instincts by 
believers.
Misguided belief in miracles?
In his influential works on Islamic eco-
nomics, notably Islam and Mammon: The 
Economic Predicaments of Islamism,8 Timur 
Kuran presents a rather more gloomy pic-
ture. To Kuran the core of the recently 
emerged idea of an Islamic economy stems 
from a notion of justice based on the two 
principles of equality in distribution and 
fairness in productive, commercial, and fi-
nancial interaction. The realization of these 
principles is presented as flowing naturally 
from the implementation of the Islamic pro-
cedures of zakat (which secures equality), 
and the prohibition of riba (which secures fairness). Kuran argues that 
this is an illusion based on unrealistic presumptions about the work-
ings of a modern market economy. The literature analyzed by Kuran 
stems mainly from the South Asian Islamic region, and is mostly not 
produced by political Islamists. It is probably correct to say that the 
writings in question tend to be of a more technical and scripturalist 
nature than that of the Arab Islamist discourse. Yet this can at best 
partially account for Kuran’s inclination to reduce Islamic economic 
thought to a misguided belief in the miraculous effect of reintroducing 
medieval economic principles. 
It would seem that in his effort to disprove the “workability” of Islam-
ist economic prescriptions Kuran becomes insensitive to the dynamic 
aspect of Islamist reformulations of Islam. He does acknowledge that 
equality and justice are part of wider set of moral injunctions. But to 
Kuran these injunctions can be summed up as a general call for altru-
istic behaviour, and this he summarily dismisses as unworkable, since 
altruism can only work within small social units, such as the family, 
and not on the scale of a nationwide market. This statement in itself 
is certainly debatable. But more importantly Kuran fails to notice that 
Islamist advocacy of hard and conscientious work, the establishment 
of merit as the sole criterion for economic decisions, and the urgency 
of economic development as central Islamic values, gives a thorough-
ly modernizing flavour to the “package” of values presented as those 
guiding an Islamic economy. Furthermore, and precisely for this reason 
the fact that efficiency, growth, employment, and industrialization are 
held forth as important goals, stands for Kuran as somehow isolated 
from, and partly in contradiction to, the “moral economy” otherwise 
propagated. A careful reading of this same moral economy would rath-
er show consistency between the moral principles advocated and what 
is set up as practical economic goals. Kuran instead ends up suggesting 
that the only link between Islamism and modernization would spring 
from social reaction against “fundamentalist” Islamic regimes. 
Kuran concentrates on discussing the feasibility of the solutions 
proposed by the “Islamic economic” literature. This leads him to dis-
regard the possibility that the inconsistencies he points to might be 
understood as expressing a tension between the resolve to promote 
a reading of the Islamic message relevant to the problems of modern-
izing society, and the equally strongly felt need to guard the sanctity of 
the scriptures. The tension in question reflects precisely the innovative 
character of the discourse.
A pro-modern ideology
On the whole, then, I would argue that mainstream Islamism in the 
Middle East as exemplified by the Egyptian movements discussed here 
should be considered as a pro-modern ideology not only in the sense 
of its stressing the need for economic and technological development, 
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